

A. LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Greetings Delegates,

It is time to switch from your routine school life and step into the shoes of a diplomat, something that most of us have dreamt about at least once. It gives us immense pleasure to welcome you to this simulation of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is the first committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA- DISEC) at the prestigious SAIMUN 2025. We look forward to an enriching and rewarding experience.

The agenda for the session being "**Global Arms Trade and the Impact of the US Second Amendment.**" We are delighted to facilitate this crucial committee simulation, addressing one of the most significant global issues today. As your Executive Board Members, we are committed to ensuring a productive and insightful experience, where you can not only learn but also enjoy the process. Your resilience and dedication will be key in making this simulation a success. Please remember the gravity of the topic at hand and approach it with the seriousness and care it deserves. We hope that you have started your initial, most basic research on the agenda and associated issues from this point on. We must first grasp the Committee's scope and that, while there may be broad discussion on this agenda, council decisions cannot address issues that fall outside the purview of the committee.

We hope that the study guide that follows will shed some light on the composition and operations of the committee. We must caution you, though, that this guide is only meant to be a helpful tool and should not be used to cover all aspects of your study for the agenda. Although the Executive Board members do anticipate that the committee debate will take a specific path as outlined in this guide, we would greatly value delegates presenting other perspectives and approaches to the topics on the agenda. Your Executive Board is meant to facilitate discussion; substantive

discussion will only occur in response to updates and inquiries from you. Unless we are making decisions regarding points of order, we shall not express our opinions on topics. We would like you to be familiar with the Rules of Procedure, but please do not view them as rigid and unalterable. In addition, we would appreciate it if the delegates had some internal discussion and swiftly informed the Executive Board of any changes they would like to see made to the rules in order to enhance debate. We strongly advise using this background information merely as the starting point for your research. It should never be your only source of support. We can only guarantee fruitful discourse when you conduct research beyond the guidelines. The Executive Board anticipates that you will provide an analysis of the data you have, not only a recitation of it. Even though there will be a lot of pressure, the fast-paced committee will be a welcome change from the typical MUN debate pace. Never be scared to make unconventional suggestions if you can effectively lobby, your peers will discuss them. We anticipate that the delegates will perform well by balancing their procedural and substantive expertise.

Finally, we want to appeal to All delegates to sincerely prepare and research for the simulation and work hard to ensure that everyone has a positive learning experience. Please get in touch with us if you have any questions or concerns.

As we enter the substantive part of this guide, we would like to take this moment to give you a brief insight into our MUNing careers as well. We also started doing MUNs back in school and hence we do understand that most of the terms might appear alien or zoom past you as bouncers! But then again we are here to help you navigate through the battlefield of blazing guns!

All the Best! Executive Board | UNGA-DISEC

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B. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

Alright! So this segment is what we call know the devil and the fear is half gone. We know we have to work a little more on our humour but we do assure you that it would not affect our ability to impart a little more knowledge about this topic than your political science book! The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was established in 1945 and serves as the First committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). As stated in Chapter 4, Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice (download it, print it, steal it, mug it up or whatever, this is your bible to MUNs), the DISEC core working principle revolves around maintain international peace and security to which extent it may, consider the principles governing disarmament and regulation of armaments, discuss any questions that may pose a threat, immediate or not, to international peace and security and may deem necessary to call upon the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to situations which may threaten the international peace and security. At no point do these responsibilities limit the general scope of the UNGA and by extension the DISEC stated forth in Article 10 of the Charter of the United Nations. The UNGA-DISEC works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament based in Geneva, Switzerland. The UNGA-DISEC is headquartered in New York City in the United States of America where it usually holds sessions once a year for a period of approximately 4 to 5 weeks. All member nations of the United Nations Organization are members of the UNGA-DISEC and currently the membership stands at 193 (Yes! Even the ones you wonder why! And then again there are the ones you wish were members and have not made the cut 'yet', sad life, sorry for being dramatic). Furthermore, the UNGA may award observer member status to any entity or international organisation as is currently held by Palestine and the Holy See (Sorry Guys, no voting privileges for you! Then again only during

documentation, we will tell you how it works). Only full members of the UNGA-DISEC are awarded a vote on resolutions; however, observer members may cast a vote on non-substantive procedural matters.

The UNGA-DISEC was established to oversee the actions of various national and non-state actors (you would be wondering what on earth are non-state actors now? Well anything that is not backed by the government is an act by a non-state actor, say terrorist organisations like the Al-Qaeda, but think... are they really never backed by a state?) and review situations whose level of urgency do not attract the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In the past, UNGA-DISEC resolutions have dealt with a wide range of issues threatened global peace with resolutions carrying out a wide range of functions like establishing new commissions, as was done in the very first resolution in 1946 which established a commission to deal with problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy; draft treaties as it did in 213 where a treaty was reached to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in Africa. If deemed necessary the UNGA can “unite for peace” as established under the UNGA resolution 377 A which state that if there if the lack of unanimity among the five permanent members of the UNSC has failed the UNSC in performing its primary responsibility, then the UNGA shall consider the matter immediately and may make recommendations including the use of armed force if a special majority is reached in the UNGA-DISEC (2/3rd's of the members). At no points shall the delegates overstep and discuss issues outside the mandate of this committee. But we are also considerate of the point that at times things being discussed in relation to disarmament can overlap with other aspects like human rights and then a little flexibility can be expected from our end to accommodate such overlaps as and when required.

Keep in mind that all resolutions (what are those? A list of recommendations/ actions/ solutions/ plans being produced before the committee that has been accepted by a majority of member nations in past sessions) passed by this

committee are non-binding resolutions and must be formatted as recommendations to the 193 nations in the committee. Furthermore, given its direct association with the United Nations General Assembly (being subsidiary organ as authorised under Article 22), it retains the powers and responsibilities of the General Assembly as outlined in Chapter IV of the Charter of the United Nations, including:

- *Article 10* “make[ing] recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.”
- *Article 11(2)* “discuss[ing] any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it...”
- *Article 11(3)* “call[ing] the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.”
- *Article 14* “recommend[ing] measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation...”

B.1. Mandate of the Committee

You would be wondering what is this brand new fancy term in the market? Well mandate refers to what this particular committee can discuss and what this committee cannot discuss. You cannot expect a tea vending machine to serve pizzas as well can you? (You definitely can expect but then again will it transpire? Well technically it shouldn't). Just FYI anything that relates to disarmament (giving up arms), threats to international security (not the security of just your nation) is within the mandate of this committee. To elaborate it further:

The United Nations General Assembly's Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), is tasked with addressing issues related to global peace and security. The primary mandates of DISEC include:

1. Establishing General Principles: Formulating general principles of cooperation for the maintenance of international peace and security.
2. Disarmament and Regulation of Armaments: Developing principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.
3. Recommendations: Making recommendations to UN Member States and the Security Council regarding these principles.
4. Proposing Topics for Security Council: Suggesting specific topics for the Security Council's consideration, although it does not directly influence the Council's decision-making process.
5. Collaborating with UNODA: Working with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to support disarmament initiatives at various levels, including nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and conventional weapons.
6. Norm-Setting Support: Providing substantive support in norm-setting within the General Assembly to further disarmament initiatives. DISEC plays a crucial role in fostering international dialogue and cooperation on disarmament and security issues, contributing to global efforts to maintain peace and stability.

C. A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF THE AGENDA

If you missed it earlier, the agenda for this session of the UNGA-DISEC is:

“Global Arms Trade and the Impact of the US Second Amendment”

Before we dive into the world of big names and lengthy conventions, this section is designed to give you an insight as to what the agenda or what we can call the problem statement is. Out of the numerous burning topics up for discussion, we chose to deliberate on the aforesaid topic to impart due gravity to a situation that has been often overlooked.

Welcome to a world where peace treaties are signed with one hand and arms deals with the other. Where war is terrible; unless, of course, it's good for business. The global arms trade is a multi-billion-dollar industry that quietly fuels conflicts, boosts political alliances, and keeps a lot of factories very busy making things that go boom. From fighter jets (all over the news recently? From F-16s to Rafals, F-22s, J-17 Thunders and what not! I know more about the generation of fighter jets than Class 11th Physics now!) to assault rifles, weapons are moving across borders faster than ever, often in the name of defence, deterrence, or just good old-fashioned profit. Now understand this, war has its own economics, two or more nations burn up their reserves buying ammunitions while the big exporters sell out their stock and reap in profits (this is your cue to look into who sells and who buys arms and ammunitions and how much?)

At the centre of this discussion is the strange and powerful relationship between national laws and global consequences. And no law is more famous or more controversial than the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. Written in 1791, when reloading a gun took about a minute (it wasn't as easy as pressing 'R' on a keyboard/ controller, we might be old but we did play our share of CS and COD) and most people were worried about redcoats, it has become a modern-day rallying cry for gun rights in the United States. The amendment promises "*the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,*" which sounds simple enough until you realize it has shaped not just American society, but global attitudes toward weapon ownership.

Because here's the catch: when one of the world's largest arms exporters also has one of the most deeply entrenched gun cultures, things start to get... interesting. The Second Amendment isn't just about what kinds of guns Americans can own. It influences U.S. policy, affects international treaties, and even makes other countries question whether civilian access to military-grade weapons is a "freedom" or a global hazard.

Meanwhile, the international community is left juggling different goals. Some countries are desperately trying to control illegal arms flows into conflict zones. Others are attempting to limit weapons sales to human rights violators. And some are simply cashing in, because war machines, it turns out, are very profitable. All of this happens under the shaky guidance of arms trade treaties, export controls, and national interests that rarely agree on what "responsible" really means.

So in this committee, you'll be stepping into a tangled web of ethics, economics, law, and politics. You'll have to ask: Should there be stricter global rules on arms exports? How does a single country's gun law affect the rest of the world? And are we serious about peace, or just really good at selling weapons while talking about it? Whether the claim of state sovereignty is an answer to everything around?

So, sharpen your policy pencils, load up on facts, and prepare for some diplomatic crossfire. This isn't just about weapons; it's about power, politics, and the perennial question: Who gets to hold the trigger?

D. LEGAL AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK GOVERNING GLOBAL ARMS TRADE AND CIVILIAN FIREARM OWNERSHIP

From this section onwards things shall get a little serious! All play and no work indeed makes Jack a dull boy! You might need to re-read things or ask someone around you for help, please do not shy away from doing so. In case you don't need any such guidance, wow you are already smarter than most of us! The global arms trade, encompassing both conventional military weapons and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), plays a pivotal role in international security, conflict escalation (again a word that you would have heard a lot in the recent days, w.r.t. the India-Pakistan conflict), and state sovereignty (Please read vividly

on what this means and especially Article 2 of the UN Charter). While global instruments aim to regulate this trade to minimize human suffering and ensure accountability, national constitutional provisions such as the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution introduce legal and normative tensions. This segment explores the complexities arising from the intersection of global disarmament frameworks and domestic rights to firearm ownership, with a particular focus on the international ramifications of US firearm jurisprudence.

D.1. International Treaties and Conventions: Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Wassenaar Arrangement, and Geneva Conventions' Provisions on Conventional Arms

D.1.1. [Arms Trade Treaty \(ATT\)](#) (these come with hyperlinks just for you to access the page faster, see we are so considerate and helpful!)

- ATT was adopted in 2013 and entered into force in 2014, it is the first legally binding instrument to regulate international trade in conventional arms.
- Key obligations include:
 - Risk assessment prior to export to ensure weapons are not used for genocide, war crimes, or terrorism.
 - Preventing diversion of arms to unauthorized users.
 - Transparency through national reporting mechanisms.
- Although the US signed the treaty in 2013, it never ratified it. In 2019, the US formally *rejected* the treaty citing *threats to constitutional rights under the Second Amendment*. Now there is a catch! When you read, cite, or quote a convention or a treaty please check if you are a signatory or have ratified the treaty or not in the first place. Also read the meaning to being a signatory, ratifying and adopting a treaty, it shall help you in

committee and beyond! Well there is no shame in it, but India supporting the NPT's adoption can be hilarious?

- The lack of US participation undermines global adherence, given that the US accounts for nearly 40% of global arms exports (the numbers game! Read from reputed and acceptable sources only)

D.1.2. [Wassenaar Arrangement](#)

- Established in 1996, the Wassenaar Arrangement is a voluntary export control regime with 42 participating states, including the US.
- Focuses on conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.
- While non-binding, it promotes responsible transfers and strengthens cooperation among exporting countries.
- Its efficacy is often limited by national discretion and the absence of enforcement mechanisms.

D.1.3. [Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols](#)

- The Geneva Conventions do not directly govern arms trade but obligate states to ensure weapons transfers do not lead to violations of international humanitarian law (IHL).
- [Common Article 1](#) obliges parties to “respect and ensure respect” for the Conventions, thereby linking arms transfers with humanitarian compliance.
- Arms trade becomes not just a matter of sovereignty but of legal responsibility under IHL.

D.2. Domestic Constitutional Provisions and Their Global Reverberations:

Analysis of the US Second Amendment and its implications for

international arms discourse

D.2.1. [The US Second Amendment](#)

- Text quoted from the US Second Amendment: “*A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.*”
- Interpreted by the US Supreme Court to confer an individual right to own firearms, especially in the following. Now one of your Chairs’ is a lawyer and he/she loves troubling people with case laws and precedents hence this segment, no points for guessing how he/she is though. Just read a little bit about what these cases said:
 - [District of Columbia v. Heller \(2008\)](#)
 - [McDonald v. City of Chicago \(2010\)](#)
- Firearms regulation in the US is thus deeply embedded in national identity and legal doctrine.

D.2.2. Global Implications

- Normative Exportation- The US model of civilian firearm ownership influences policies in other states, sometimes at the cost of undermining gun control advocacy.
- Treaty Resistance- The Second Amendment is frequently cited in opposition to international agreements perceived to infringe upon domestic rights.

- Illicit Flows- The sheer volume of firearms in the US, which is over 393 million civilian-owned guns, has contributed to transnational illicit arms trafficking.

D.3. Normative Tensions Between State Security and Civil Liberties: Right to Bear Arms vs. Global Arms Control Imperatives

This section highlights the normative, legal, and political tensions between the domestic right to bear arms and the global drive toward arms control. It basically compares the US perspective against a more globalised approach. The comparison below encapsulates these conflicting imperatives:

Dimension	Right to Bear Arms (US Second Amendment)	Global Arms Control Imperatives
Legal Basis	Constitutional law (US Supreme Court interpretations)	International law (ATT, IHL, customary norms)
Scope	Individual and civilian rights to possess firearms	State obligations to regulate arms trade and prevent diversion
Objective	Protection of personal liberty, self-defence, and deterrence	Reduction in global arms proliferation and conflict mitigation
Regulatory Mechanism	Domestic judicial oversight, state legislatures	Multilateral treaties, export control regimes
Flexibility	Rigid due to constitutional entrenchment	Relatively flexible through diplomatic negotiation and opt-outs

Effect on Arms Trade	Facilitates widespread private ownership and large-scale production	Aims to restrict irresponsible transfers and improve transparency
Global Influence	Promotes gun rights narratives internationally	Promotes disarmament, peace, and humanitarian compliance
Tension Points	Seen as obstructive to treaty ratification and international consensus	Criticized for overlooking domestic political constraints

This juxtaposition reveals the crux of the global normative debate: whether individual liberties should outweigh collective security needs, and how domestic legal cultures can coexist with universal disarmament goals.

E. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS REGULATING ARMS TRADE AND NATIONAL GUN POLICIES

If you made it this far on the first time reading this guide then believe us, you are more patient than you thought! Great going, it took us 4 days to reach here for context. This section basically talks about how arms change arms! That was poetic. It entails how countries buy and sell arms, what international oversight is in force currently. It is your job as delegates to find the flaws in these that need fixing.

E.1. Role of Multilateral Institutions: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), ATT Secretariat, and Regional Disarmament Initiatives

Multilateral institutions provide the global normative and regulatory frameworks necessary for arms control. However, their efficacy is often conditioned by the

domestic policies of major arms exporters—particularly the United States—and its constitutional provisions like the Second Amendment.

- [E.1.1 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs \(UNODA\)](#)
(remember to make good use of the hyperlinks!)

UNODA leads global efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), particularly through the UN Programme of Action (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). While UNODA facilitates international cooperation, it lacks enforcement powers. The Second Amendment complicates US engagement with these initiatives, as any perceived external interference in domestic gun rights provokes constitutional and political resistance.

Case Study – Latin America (Mexico & El Salvador):

UNODA has partnered with countries in Central America to trace firearms involved in violent crime. Many of these firearms were originally exported (often legally) from the United States. The difficulty in tracing these weapons back to source is exacerbated by weak US domestic regulations and the resistance to comprehensive firearm registries, partially driven by Second Amendment concerns.

(These boxes resemble some parts of your textbooks right? It was designed that way to be interactive! Not to scare you though! We promise with fingers crossed)

- [E.1.2. Arms Trade Treaty \(ATT\) Secretariat](#)

The ATT, adopted in 2013, is the first legally binding international treaty regulating the global arms trade. It requires state parties to assess the potential misuse of exported arms, especially in contexts involving human rights violations or terrorism.

Despite being a signatory, the United States never ratified the ATT, citing constitutional concerns, specifically around the Second Amendment. In 2019, the US government formally withdrew its signature, framing the treaty as a threat to domestic gun rights and sovereignty.

Case Study – Saudi Arabia and Yemen Conflict:

US arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, despite evidence of violations of international humanitarian law in Yemen, continued with limited oversight. If the ATT had been fully ratified and implemented by the US, such transfers would have required stricter risk assessments. This showcases how domestic constitutional frameworks, like the Second Amendment, can obstruct multilateral accountability.

- *E.1.3. Regional Disarmament Initiatives*

UNODA's regional centres, such as [UNRCPD](#) (Asia-Pacific) and [UNREC](#) (Africa)—support localized disarmament efforts. These centres focus on building state capacity and enhancing transparency in arms flows.

Case Study – West Africa's [ECOWAS](#) Moratorium on SALWs:

The ECOWAS Moratorium has significantly reduced intra-regional arms transfers. However, the influx of firearms from North America, especially from loosely regulated US civilian markets, continues to undermine these efforts. This illustrates how one nation's domestic gun laws can have trans-regional ripple effects.

E.2. National Regulatory Frameworks: US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), National Firearms Act, and Federal Gun Control Legislation

Domestic regulatory institutions shape the scope and direction of a country's arms trade policies and internal control over firearms. In the United States, these frameworks are deeply intertwined with the Second Amendment.

- E.2.1. [US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives \(ATF\)](#)

The ATF is tasked with regulating the firearms industry, issuing licenses, and investigating illegal firearms trafficking. However, the bureau operates under tight legislative constraints imposed by Congress—often influenced by Second Amendment advocates and lobbying groups.

Case Study – [Operation Fast and Furious \(2006–2011\)](#):

This controversial ATF operation allowed firearms sales to suspected traffickers with the goal of tracking them to Mexican cartels. Due to *gaps in regulation and oversight*, many weapons were lost and later found at crime scenes in Mexico. The backlash led to greater scrutiny of ATF operations, but efforts to increase regulatory authority were blocked due to political pressures rooted in Second Amendment protections.

- E.2.2. [National Firearms Act \(NFA\), Gun Control Act \(GCA\), and Brady Act](#)

Federal laws like the National Firearms Act, 1934 (NFA), Guns Control Act, 1968 (GCA), and Brady Act (1993) impose licensing, background checks, and restrictions on certain weapon types. Yet, "*loopholes remain*", such as private sales at gun shows without background checks (the "gun show loophole").

These gaps hinder US compliance with international norms under the ATT or UN PoA and often lead to weapons exported legally from the US entering illicit markets abroad.

E.3. Influence of Lobby Groups and Civil Society: NRA (National Rifle Association of America), Gun Owners of America, International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)

E.3.1. [National Rifle Association \(NRA\)](#)

The NRA actively lobbies against most forms of arms control, both domestically and internationally. It has framed international treaties like the ATT as threats to the Second Amendment and mobilized political resistance against their ratification.

Case Study – ATT Opposition Campaign (2013–2019):

The NRA led a national campaign claiming the ATT would allow the UN to "interfere in US gun laws." This narrative, though it is legally inaccurate (opinion based statement) succeeded in shaping public opinion and Congressional resistance, culminating in the US withdrawal from the treaty in 2019.

- **E.3.2. [Gun Owners of America \(GOA\)](#)**

Even more uncompromising than the NRA, GOA opposes any form of gun control, viewing both national regulation and international treaties as erosions of liberty. Such groups contribute to the political polarization of arms control in the US and indirectly weaken global arms control initiatives.

- **E.3.3. [International Action Network on Small Arms \(IANSA\)](#)**

IANSA coordinates civil society campaigns to control small arms globally, advocating for stronger national laws and international cooperation. It supports survivors of gun violence and lobbies for implementation of the ATT and UN PoA.

Case Study – Civil Society Impact in the Caribbean:

IANSA has worked with Caribbean states, where illegal US-made guns’ fuel gang violence, in order to amplify survivor voices and promote gun control. While effective regionally, their efforts are limited by the persistent flow of arms from US civilian markets, where domestic protections under the Second Amendment obstruct upstream reforms.

F. CASE STUDIES AND EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS INTO ARMS TRADE AND GUN OWNERSHIP IMPACTS

It’s time to put our theories to the test and look at how the global arms trade and gun ownership play out in the real world. Behind every debate on “national security” or “personal freedom” lies a trail of statistics, stories, and suspiciously large weapons shipments. Let’s take a quick tour of the globe; no passport needed, just bring your critical thinking and maybe a bulletproof vest.

The global arms trade, both legal and illegal, fuels insecurity in both conflict and non-conflict zones. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), in particular, has had wide-reaching effects: from undermining fragile democracies to worsening violent crime and prolonging civil wars. This section examines key case studies that provide empirical insights into the cascading effects of unregulated arms flow and gun ownership.

F.1. Spill over Effects of US Gun Exports: Small arms proliferation in Latin America and the Caribbean

The U.S. is the world's largest exporter of civilian firearms and a significant portion of these weapons end up fuelling violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, both legally and through illicit trafficking networks. To name a few:

- **F.1.1. Mexico**

An estimated 70% of firearms recovered from crime scenes in Mexico and submitted for tracing from 2014-2018 were of U.S. origin (ATF). A 2021 Mexican government lawsuit against U.S. gun manufacturers claimed over 500,000 guns are smuggled across the U.S.-Mexico border each year, contributing to cartel violence and the deaths of tens of thousands annually. The expiration of the U.S. Federal Assault Weapons Ban in 2004 saw a near doubling of gun-related homicides in Mexican municipalities bordering U.S. states without gun restrictions (Garcia-Ponce, 2023).

- **F.1.2. Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala (Northern Triangle)**

The Northern Triangle countries consistently rank among the most violent in the world outside of active war zones. According to a Small Arms Survey report, 60% of homicides in Honduras involve firearms, many traced to U.S. commercial sales or smuggling routes. Weak institutional oversight and corruption have enabled traffickers to re-sell imported legal weapons to criminal gangs and paramilitaries.

- **F.1.3. Other Caribbean Nations**

A 2023 GAO (Government Accountability Office, U.S.) report found that 73% of all firearms recovered and traced in 25 Caribbean countries between 2018 and 2022 originated in the United States. Jamaica's Prime Minister Andrew Holness has publicly appealed to the U.S. to crack down on arms trafficking, stating that

it is a “public health crisis” in the Caribbean. The Bahamas and Barbados, too, have reported surges in gun crime directly linked to U.S.-made handguns and rifles.

F.2. Conflict Zones and Illicit Arms Networks: Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa as Recipients of Diverted Legal Arms

The diversion of legal arms to unauthorized users, either through theft, corrupt intermediaries, or end-use violations, has severely destabilized regions like the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. The most affected regions being:

- **F.2.1. Yemen**

Since the escalation of conflict in 2015, arms legally sold to Saudi Arabia and the UAE by the U.S., U.K., and France have been found in the hands of Houthi rebels, AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), and various militias. A CNN investigation (2019) revealed that U.S.-supplied vehicles and rifles were transferred to extremist factions despite end-user agreements.

- **F.2.2. Libya**

Following the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, large stockpiles of state-owned arms fell into militia control. Many of these weapons, including anti-aircraft guns, rocket launchers, and small arms have since surfaced in conflicts in Mali, Chad, and Nigeria. According to the UN Panel of Experts, arms from Libya continue to be trafficked across the Sahel via well-established smuggling routes.

- **F.2.3. Sudan and South Sudan**

Despite embargoes, both countries have received diverted arms from Eastern Europe and China. In 2013, during the South Sudanese civil war, Chinese-supplied weapons were found with government forces implicated in human rights

violations. Reports indicate that private brokers circumvented embargoes by routing shipments through Uganda and Kenya.

- *F.2.4. Nigeria*

The conflict with Boko Haram has seen heavy use of both stolen Nigerian military weapons and smuggled arms. A 2020 UNODC study found that nearly 500 million small arms circulate in West Africa, with Nigeria accounting for a significant share, much of it sourced from diverted or stolen arms during cross-border operations.

F.3. Domestic Mass Shootings and Policy Inertia: Evaluating the U.S. Gun Violence Crisis Through Global Human Rights Lenses

While much of the global focus is on arms transfers between states, the internal implications of unregulated gun ownership are equally grave, particularly in the United States.

- *F.3.1. Gun Violence as a Human Rights Issue*

According to Amnesty International's 2018 report, over 39,000 people in the U.S. die from gun-related injuries annually, including suicides, homicides, and unintentional shootings. The persistent failure to implement robust gun control policies undermines citizens' rights to life and security, violating the U.S.'s human rights obligations under the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).

- *F.3.2. Mass Shootings*

In 2023 alone, there were more than 600 mass shootings in the U.S., as per the Gun Violence Archive. High-profile incidents such as:

- **Uvalde, Texas (2022):** 21 killed in a school shooting.

- **Buffalo, New York (2022):** 10 killed in a racially motivated attack.
- **Las Vegas (2017):** 60 killed, the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history.

These cases reveal patterns of legally acquired semi-automatic weapons being used with devastating effects.

- *F.3.3. Policy Inertia*

Despite overwhelming public support for background checks and assault weapon bans (with 88% of Americans favouring universal background checks: Pew, 2023), legislative progress remains slow. The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (2022) was the first major federal gun control bill in decades, yet critics argue it falls short of comprehensive reform.

- *F.3.4. International Perspective*

UN Special Rapporteurs and human rights bodies have criticized the U.S. for its failure to prevent gun violence, labelling it a “human rights crisis of exceptional scale”. Lessons from countries like Australia (post-Port Arthur reforms), Japan (strict licensing system), and the U.K. (post-Dun Blane bans) illustrate that political will and public health framing can yield significant reductions in gun violence.

These case studies vividly demonstrate how poorly regulated arms trade and gun ownership ripple across borders and societies strengthening criminal networks, fuelling civil conflict, and eroding public safety. Whether through direct exports, diverted legal arms, or domestic policy failure, the global consequences of weak arms control regimes are undeniable. A strong, enforceable international arms framework built on transparency, end-use accountability, and cooperation is not merely a policy ideal; it is a humanitarian imperative.

G. CHALLENGES IN ESTABLISHING A COHERENT GLOBAL ARMS CONTROL REGIME

If you have made it this far! Call yourself a legend and probably go grab yourself a cookie, you are already ahead of 80% of the competition! Getting the world to agree on arms control is kind of like trying to organize a group project with 193 classmates, each with their own agenda, secret stash of nerf guns, and wildly different definitions of “peaceful.” Everyone claims they want fewer weapons, but no one wants to be the first to put theirs down. It’s a diplomatic tug-of-war where trust is low, profits are high, and political hypocrisy is practically a tradition.

The pursuit of a unified global arms control framework is filled with multifaceted challenges. They stem from the tension between national interests and international oversight, the lack of universal treaty adherence and robust compliance mechanisms, and the complexities introduced by dual-use technologies and export control loopholes.

G.1. “National Sovereignty” vs. “International Oversight”: Resistance to International Regulation from Major Arms-Exporting Countries

Major arms-exporting nations often prioritize their sovereign right to self-defence and economic interests over international regulatory frameworks. This stance leads to resistance against binding international agreements that may constrain their arms trade activities.

- *G.1.1. United States:* While the U.S. signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, it has not ratified it. Concerns about the treaty infringing upon Second Amendment rights and national sovereignty have been cited as primary reasons for this reluctance.

- G.1.2. Russia and China: Both countries abstained from voting on the ATT and have not ratified it. Their reservations are rooted in the belief that the treaty could be used to justify political interference in their internal affairs and constrain their strategic partnerships.

Implications: The reluctance of major arms exporters to fully commit to international oversight mechanisms undermines the effectiveness of global arms control efforts. Their non-participation creates loopholes that can be exploited, leading to unregulated arms flows into conflict zones.

G.2. Lack of Treaty Universality and Compliance Mechanisms: Enforcement Issues in the ATT and Optional Reporting Practices

As of now, the ATT has 116 state parties and 130 signatories. However, several key arms-exporting and importing countries remain outside its purview, limiting its global applicability and effectiveness.

- G.2.1. Compliance Mechanisms:
 - G.2.1.1. Optional Reporting: The ATT encourages, but does not mandate, annual reporting on arms transfers. This optional nature leads to inconsistent reporting, hindering transparency and accountability.
 - G.2.1.2. Enforcement Limitations: The treaty lacks robust enforcement mechanisms to address non-compliance. There are no provisions for sanctions or penalties against states that violate its terms, reducing its deterrent effect.
- G.2.2. Case Study:

Saudi Arabia and Yemen Conflict: Despite evidence of arms supplied to Saudi Arabia being used in the Yemen conflict, resulting in significant civilian

casualties, there has been limited accountability or enforcement action under the ATT framework.

Implications: The absence of universal participation and enforceable compliance measures weakens the treaty's ability to regulate the global arms trade effectively. It allows for continued arms flows to areas with ongoing human rights violations and conflicts.

G.3. Dual-Use Technologies and Loopholes in Export Controls: **Undermining of Arms Embargoes and Circumvention via Third-Party** **States**

Items that have both civilian and military applications, such as certain chemicals, electronics, and software, pose significant challenges for export controls. Regulating these technologies requires balancing national security concerns with commercial interests.

- **G.3.1. Export Control Loopholes:**
 - **G.3.1.1. Third-Party Transfers:** Arms and dual-use items are often routed through intermediary countries to circumvent direct export restrictions. These third-party states may have less stringent controls, facilitating the diversion of arms to unauthorized end-users.

North Korea: Despite international sanctions, North Korea has acquired dual-use technologies through complex networks involving front companies and third-party countries, undermining non-proliferation efforts.

Implications: The proliferation of dual-use technologies and the exploitation of export control loopholes compromise the integrity of arms embargoes and non-

proliferation regimes. They enable unauthorized actors to access sensitive technologies, escalating regional and global security risks.

Establishing a coherent global arms control regime necessitates addressing the inherent tensions between national sovereignty and international oversight, achieving universal treaty participation with enforceable compliance mechanisms, and closing loopholes in export controls related to dual-use technologies. Without concerted efforts to overcome these challenges, the global community will continue to grapple with the destabilizing effects of unregulated arms proliferation.

H. QUESTIONS A COMMITTEE SHOULD INCORPORATE

- i. How does the global arms trade challenge the United Nations' efforts to maintain international peace and security?
- ii. What roles and responsibilities do UN Member States have under existing arms control treaties, such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
- iii. To what extent does the interpretation of the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution affect the global consensus on arms regulation?
- iv. How can UNGA DISEC encourage major arms-exporting countries to align national gun policies with international arms control norms?
- v. What mechanisms can the UN develop or strengthen to ensure greater transparency and accountability in the international arms trade?
- vi. How should UNGA DISEC address the legal and policy gaps that allow for the diversion of legally traded arms into illicit markets?
- vii. What kind of international framework can balance a country's sovereign right to national defense with the need for global oversight?
- viii. How can UNGA DISEC promote universalization and effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty among Member States?

- ix. What steps can be taken at the multilateral level to mitigate the impact of domestic gun laws, such as the Second Amendment, on global arms proliferation?
- x. How can the UN foster multilateral cooperation to curb the humanitarian and security consequences of unregulated or poorly regulated arms transfers?

I. IMPORTANT INFORMATION AND LINKS

Sources Accepted:

There is always a heated debate as to what websites and sources can be used for research and are accepted as viable sources in a Model UN conference.

While the answer cannot be through a straitjacket formula as it varies from Executive Board Member to Executive Board Member. While you can research from anything and everything that is available on the internet, please do note that facts and figures can be quoted only from reliable documents or sources. For this simulation, UN documents, Official Government Documents, your national news agency reports and Reuters (till the point it is not countered by a country that does not believe in Reuters' reports) are reliable sources of information.

AI Usage:

We have noticed that there has been a significant rise in the use of AI in speeches across MUNs. While you can use AI for research and fine tuning your points please refrain from using to write your speeches, be creative, make mistakes, we are all here to learn but avoid AI. And fair warning! We have considerable experience in dealing with speeches that are AI generated and hence can easily know if its AI generated, in such a scenario you shall be marked down on your speech. Any which way, be confident and see you all very soon! Happy researching!

<https://disarmament.unoda.org/att/>

<https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/att/att.html>

<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3951441?ln=en&v=pdf>

<https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/salw/>

<https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3731.doc.htm>

<https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/att/>

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/small-arms/>

https://stopusarmstomexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/No-Shelter-from-Storm_New-Data-on-Trafficked-Weapons.pdf