
Security Council

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30 May 2026

Dear Delegates,

The Executive Board welcomes each representative to the simulation of the United Nations Security Council. The Council shall be addressing “*Assessing the Impact of the Ongoing Armed Confrontation Between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran on International Peace and Security.*” over the course of two days. This committee will be running as a **Crisis Committee**, and hence will entail an experience, much different from other committees.

We are focusing on the situation in Iran that evolved into an armed conflict, with US and Israel launching Operation Epic Fury. **The freeze date for this committee is 30th March 2026, i.e., anything that has happened after 30th March 2026 would not have happened** for the sake of committee proceedings and knowledge of the same must be disregarded, though any knowledge of actions or events preceding the freeze date is to be taken into account.

We will be introducing crisis updates during the course of the committee, to which the delegates are expected to respond to. We will try to incorporate as many delegates as possible in the crisis, in order to ensure participation in the committee. The delegates will be free to issue directives on behalf of their nation, which (once approved by EB) will have the power of the law/order from the competent authority of the country’s government. This means that you can issue orders, that any department or institution of your government has the capacity to issue, to address and respond to the crisis (explained in detail in sections below).

As we are conducting the committee in a crisis format, the delegates should research the broader aspects of their foreign and domestic policy. The updates introduced in the committee will remain in the domains of plausibility, and hence won’t be too far-fetched. This committee would

require more critical thinking and analytical skills to react and respond to the crisis and the evolving situation.

The Security Council shall be having Provisional Rules of Procedure of UNSC (RoP followed at the real UNSC) figuring prominently in the proceedings, with certain deviations as required. The Security Council being a very important organ of the UN, derives several of its powers from UN Charter and hence it is vital for every delegate to be thorough with relevant articles of UN Charter and **it's expected that delegates go through the UN charter especially Chapters 5 and 7.**

After saying this, the experience you have in this council begins and ends with you only. We expect every delegate to imitate their state to the best of their ability and remain in line with your respective agendas the entire duration of the conference. In order for productive debate to take place, we all must remain respectful and cordial while interacting throughout the conference. We will not tolerate disruptive and disrespectful behaviour as this is a mature learning environment. **Also feel free to approach us whenever you feel the need of clarity on any subject.**

We would again reiterate that this is not going to be a conventional committee, but a different experience. It usually seems more fun and interesting than the normal committees and hence I hope you have fun during this committee.

THE FIRST CRISIS UPDATES ARE MENTIONED IN THIS LETTER AFTER THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS SECTION OF THE SAME.

(signed) Shohan Swaastik Mohapatra

President of the Security Council

(signed) Satwik Nanda

Vice-President of the Security Council

Mandate of the Security Council

The Charter of the United Nations established six principal organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened. All members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member States, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member States are obligated to implement as enshrined in the Charter. When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Security Council's first action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful means. The Council may:

- Set forth principles for such an agreement;
- Undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
- Dispatch a mission;
- Appoint special envoys;
- Request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of disputes.

When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council's primary concern is to bring them to an end as soon as possible. In that case, the Council may:

- Issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;
- Dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.

Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including:

- Economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans;
- Severance of diplomatic relations;
- Blockade;
- Or even collective military action.

A chief concern is to focus action on those responsible for the policies or practices condemned by the international community, while minimising the impact of the measures taken on other parts of the populations and economy.

Procedural Aspect

As mentioned earlier, the committee will be working in crisis format, and hence we would like to outline how the committee would be functioning in essence, though things may change if required. We will start the committee with opening statements on the basis of events of the 1st crisis update (attached at the end). After opening statements, the floor will be open for directives for a specified time, following which there will be simple consultation or discussion amongst the delegates regarding the events and crisis. This flow will be followed after each crisis update is introduced. This process will be further explained by us before we start the committee on the first day for a detailed understanding.

Directives

Directives are tools that are of primary importance in a crisis committee. Each nation has in its disposal certain **diplomatic, economic and military measures**. Delegates act as the legal representative and agent for their state and can commit those resources in order to achieve an objective. In order to employ those resources, delegates must use directives. Directives are plans that consist of orders and actions that a nation wants to take to tackle the situation at hand. For example, a country sends in a directive to send some military units (specifics required on the nature and quantity) to an area for a specified mission. Another example would be a nation sending in a directive to close its embassy in a country, or putting economic sanctions on individuals or countries as a whole. Hence directives are action orders from a country to any person(s), institution(s), or organisation(s), that comes under the purview of the government of the country, to take or not to take a certain action. Once a directive is issued and ratified by the EB, the action in the directive, for the purposes of the committee, will have taken or will take place.

The EB will open and declare when the floor is open for directives and only then shall delegates issue directives. All directives would first need to be sent to the EB for ratification, and once ratified by the EB the directives will be declared passed or failed. Note that the ratification of directives by EB is to ensure that the action that a directive is trying to take is feasible and could take place in reality. Unlike in resolutions there is no need for any perambulatory or operative clauses whilst framing a directive. The objective of the action and the procedure through which it will be implemented along with the details of the same is required in a directive.

Types of Directives-

1. Action Order- It is issued by a single delegate on behalf of their nation, for an action to take place. If and when the directive is ratified

by the EB, it will be declared so to the entire committee that such action has been taken by the nation. Ex- Sending fighter jets to attack a certain area.

2. Joint Directive- It is issued by 2 or more delegates on behalf of their respective nations, for a combined effort of both the nations to take a particular action. It is to be noted that both the delegates need to be present and agree for such a directive to be issued. Ex- international military operation.
3. Covert Directive- This is a type of directive that once ratified by the EB, will not be declared to the committee but only the delegate who has issued the directive. Hence it is covert in nature, but it is subject to disclosure by EB if it hampers actions of another directive.

Format of Directive-

Type of Directive

From- Name(s) of the Nation(s)

Detailed plan of action for the directive

1st CRISIS UPDATE

Tehran announces new implementing regulations under its “Strait of Hormuz Management Plan,” expanding the categories of “hostile” and “non-compliant” vessels that may be denied passage or boarded by the IRGC Navy, further formalising Iran’s claim to regulate which ships can transit the strait.

The United States issues updated maritime security advisories urging commercial vessels to avoid the Strait of Hormuz where possible and to maintain distance from US warships, while additional destroyers and support vessels enter the Gulf of Oman to reinforce existing patrols.

New satellite-based tracking data shows ship movements through the Strait of Hormuz in early April at only a small fraction of pre-war averages, with most remaining traffic consisting of regional feeder ships and a limited number of tankers operating under special arrangements with Iran.

Freight rates for oil supertankers on alternative routes, such as the Cape of Good Hope, hit or remain near record highs, and energy-importing states in Asia warn of rising costs and potential supply bottlenecks as they struggle to replace disrupted Gulf flows.

Iranian state media releases videos and imagery showing IRGC commandos boarding or closely escorting foreign-flagged commercial vessels near the Strait, highlighting Iran’s operational control over key approaches and signalling its ability to stop or permit shipping at will.

Gulf Cooperation Council members, along with key Asian energy importers, step up consultations on possible joint monitoring, convoy, or burden-sharing arrangements to safeguard limited shipping that still attempts to use the Strait, while publicly avoiding steps seen as directly aligning with either side in the war.

Broader Backgrounds for the Updates

1. Iranian Nuclear Programme

1.1 Emergence of International Concerns

International scrutiny of Iran's nuclear programme intensified in 2002 following revelations regarding undeclared nuclear facilities and activities. In response, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiated extensive investigations into Iran's nuclear activities and safeguards declarations. In 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol to its NPT Safeguards Agreement and temporarily agreed to suspend enrichment-related activities, granting the Agency broader inspection authority and greater access to nuclear sites.

Despite periods of cooperation, tensions between Iran and the IAEA continued over unresolved safeguards questions and the scope of Iran's enrichment programme. In 2005, Iran resumed certain nuclear activities, including uranium conversion at Isfahan, contributing to growing international concern regarding the direction of the programme.

1.2 UN Security Council Involvement and Sanctions

In 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors referred the Iranian nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council after determining that outstanding safeguards concerns remained unresolved. The Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 1696 demanding suspension of enrichment-related activities, followed by Resolution 1737, which imposed the first round of sanctions linked to Iran's nuclear programme.

Between 2007 and 2012, the Security Council adopted additional sanctions resolutions while the IAEA continued reporting unresolved verification concerns and possible military dimensions associated with Iran's nuclear activities. During this period, the Agency repeatedly called on Iran to provide greater transparency and cooperation regarding safeguards investigations.

1.3 Diplomatic Engagement and the JCPOA

Diplomatic efforts intensified in 2013 when Iran and the IAEA signed the Framework for Cooperation aimed at resolving outstanding issues. In the same year, Iran and the P5+1 agreed to the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), an interim arrangement that expanded IAEA monitoring and verification activities while broader negotiations continued.

These negotiations resulted in the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015 between Iran and the E3/EU+3. Under the

agreement, Iran accepted restrictions on uranium enrichment, centrifuge numbers, and nuclear stockpiles in exchange for sanctions relief. The JCPOA also established extensive IAEA monitoring and verification measures over Iran's declared nuclear facilities.

In January 2016, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had completed the nuclear-related steps required under the agreement, marking "Implementation Day" and the beginning of formal JCPOA implementation.

1.4 US Withdrawal and Renewed Verification Disputes

On 8 May 2018, the United States announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions on Iran. Although the IAEA continued verification and monitoring activities under the agreement, Iran gradually reduced compliance with certain JCPOA commitments beginning in 2019, including limits relating to enrichment levels and stockpile size.

From 2020 onward, the IAEA increasingly focused on safeguards issues concerning undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple locations in Iran. In 2021, Iran suspended implementation of additional transparency measures associated with the JCPOA, reducing the Agency's monitoring capabilities and continuity of knowledge regarding certain nuclear activities.

Between 2022 and March 2026, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted multiple resolutions calling on Iran to cooperate fully with safeguards investigations and provide technically credible explanations regarding unresolved safeguards issues. Throughout this period, the Agency continued inspections, reporting, and technical discussions with Iran while maintaining that several key safeguards questions remained unresolved.

2. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the US Withdrawal

2.1 Origins and Core Provisions

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was concluded in July 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, plus Germany) and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2231 (2015). Its central objective was to ensure that Iran's nuclear programme remained exclusively peaceful by extending the "breakout time" required for Iran to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, in return for phased relief from nuclear-related sanctions.

Key nuclear provisions included strict caps on uranium enrichment, a limit on the size of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, a significant reduction in installed centrifuges, and the reconfiguration of the Arak heavy-water

reactor to prevent production of weapons-grade plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was granted enhanced access and monitoring authority, including continuous surveillance at key sites, providing an unprecedented verification regime over Iran's declared nuclear facilities.

2.2 Implementation and Early Compliance

The JCPOA's "Implementation Day" was declared in January 2016, after the IAEA verified that Iran had taken the required initial steps, such as reducing its enriched uranium stockpile and removing centrifuges. In return, the European Union, the United States, and others lifted or suspended a wide range of nuclear-related sanctions, enabling Iran to increase oil exports and reconnect partially with the global financial system.

From 2016 to early 2018, the IAEA issued multiple reports confirming Iran's compliance with the nuclear commitments specified in the JCPOA. While political debates continued over Iran's ballistic missile programme and regional activities, the verification record during this period was generally assessed by the IAEA and many JCPOA parties as satisfactory in terms of nuclear restrictions.

2.3 US Withdrawal and Re-Imposition of Sanctions

On 8 May 2018, the United States announced that it was ceasing participation in the JCPOA and re-imposing US nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, citing concerns about the agreement's "sunset" clauses, Iran's missile activities, and regional conduct. A wind-down period followed, after which, on 5 November 2018, Washington fully restored sanctions that had been lifted or waived under the deal, targeting critical sectors including energy, shipping, and finance.

The re-imposition of US secondary sanctions led many international companies and banks to halt business with Iran, sharply reducing the economic benefits Tehran had expected from the JCPOA. Other JCPOA parties, particularly the European signatories, declared their continued support for the agreement and attempted to preserve trade channels with Iran, but their efforts only partially mitigated the impact of US sanctions.

2.4 Iran's Progressive Nuclear Escalation

Beginning in 2019, Iran responded to the US withdrawal and sanctions by gradually ceasing to observe several nuclear limits under the JCPOA, while framing its actions as reversible if sanctions relief were restored. These steps included exceeding caps on enriched uranium stockpile size, increasing enrichment levels beyond the JCPOA limit, installing and

operating additional advanced centrifuges, and reducing cooperation with the IAEA's monitoring and transparency measures.

By 2024, reports from the IAEA and statements from European JCPOA parties indicated that Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile was many times above the JCPOA threshold, including significant quantities enriched up to 60 per cent, and that inspectors' ability to verify the peaceful nature of the programme had been seriously constrained. In 2025, as JCPOA-related timelines reached their formal end and in the wake of the June 2025 strikes, Iran further curtailed cooperation with the IAEA and declared it no longer considered itself bound by the deal's limitations.

3. European Union on Iranian Nuclear Issue

3.1 Safeguards Issues and Iran's Lack of Cooperation

The European Union (EU) stated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains unable to resolve outstanding safeguards issues due to Iran's prolonged lack of cooperation. According to the EU, this situation prevents the Agency from providing assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. The EU noted that, despite five Board resolutions and numerous opportunities over more than five years, Iran has not clarified these issues through what it described as full and technically credible explanations. Such explanations would allow the Agency to confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations. The EU further linked these concerns to statements by Iranian officials regarding Iran's capacity to assemble a nuclear weapon.

3.2 Undeclared Nuclear Activities and EU's Concerns

The EU referred to the IAEA Board of Governors' November 2022 resolution, which stated that it was essential and urgent for Iran to clarify all outstanding safeguards issues. These issues concern unexplained nuclear-related activities at multiple undeclared locations involving undeclared nuclear material that, according to the EU's statement, may still exist in Iran outside Agency safeguards. The EU stated that Iran's continued failure to cooperate remains a matter of concern and recalled that the Board's November 2024 resolution reaffirmed that Iran should provide all necessary information and access without delay in order to fulfil its legal obligations. The EU stated that such cooperation is necessary for the Agency to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material.

3.3 EU on the Modified Code 3.1

The EU called on Iran to resume the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol and to bring it into force, arguing that this would enable the Agency to provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The EU also stated that Iran's decision to stop implementing modified Code 3.1 is

inconsistent with its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement and Subsidiary Arrangements and argued that this limits the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

3.4 Unaccounted Nuclear Material and the JHL Facility

The EU also referred to the Agency's findings regarding nuclear material that remains unaccounted for in the material balance associated with Iran's undeclared uranium metal production activities at JHL. It noted that no progress had been reported in resolving this discrepancy and stated that Iran should clarify the matter rather than reject the Agency's evaluation. The EU emphasized the Agency's technical expertise and authority in investigating such issues.

3.5 Inspector Designations and Verification Challenges

Regarding inspections, the EU referenced the Director General's statement that Iran had initially agreed to consider, but ultimately declined, the designation of four additional experienced inspectors proposed by the Agency. The EU also noted that Iran had not reversed its earlier decision to withdraw the designations of several experienced Agency inspectors. According to the EU, these measures affect the Agency's ability to conduct verification activities in Iran, particularly at enrichment facilities.

3.6 Lack of Progress on the March 2023 Joint Statement

The EU further stated that implementation of the March 2023 Joint Statement between Iran and the Agency had shown no significant progress over the previous two years. It reiterated the Director General's call for Iran to implement the Joint Statement through greater engagement with the Agency.

4. US/Israel-Iran Hostilities of 2025

4.1 Overview of the 2025 Escalation

In June 2025, tensions over Iran's nuclear programme and regional activities escalated into a short but intense armed conflict involving large-scale Israeli and later US strikes on Iranian territory, followed by extensive Iranian missile and drone retaliation. The confrontation, widely described as the "Twelve-Day War," marked the most serious direct fighting between Iran and Israel, and between Iran and the United States, since 1979.

Initial Israeli strikes on or around 13 June 2025 targeted key Iranian nuclear and military facilities, reportedly including enrichment-related sites and elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command structure. In response, Iran launched large salvos of missiles and

drones toward Israeli territory, some of which were intercepted by air and missile defence systems, while others caused damage and casualties.

4.2 US Entry into the Conflict

Following the initial Israeli operation, the United States conducted its own strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, including facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and near Isfahan, declaring that these actions were intended to degrade Iran's capacity to advance its nuclear programme. US officials claimed that the strikes significantly set back Iran's nuclear capabilities, while Iranian authorities acknowledged damage but stressed that key activities could be rebuilt.

Iran condemned the US strikes as a violation of its sovereignty and an escalation of the conflict, warning that US military bases and assets in the region could become targets. Tehran subsequently launched missiles toward the Al Udeid air base in Qatar and other sites associated with US forces, with available reporting suggesting that most of these projectiles were intercepted and did not cause mass casualties.

4.3 Iranian Retaliation and Regional Spillover

Over the twelve days of hostilities, Iran carried out multiple waves of missile and drone attacks against Israel, aiming at military installations and urban centres. Israel reported intercepting a substantial portion of incoming weapons but acknowledged civilian and military casualties, as well as damage to infrastructure and temporary disruptions to daily life and economic activity.

Israel, for its part, sustained repeated air and missile strikes across Iran, including areas around Tehran and other major cities, targeting airports, command facilities, and sites linked to missile operations and air defence. Iran-aligned armed groups in neighbouring countries also threatened or conducted limited attacks, raising fears of a wider regional war, although large-scale attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure and shipping remained limited during this phase.

4.4 Humanitarian Impact and Ceasefire

Iranian authorities reported several hundred deaths, including civilians, as a result of the strikes on Iranian cities and infrastructure, while Israeli sources reported dozens of fatalities and injuries due to Iranian missile and drone attacks. Independent verification of casualty figures has been difficult, and various actors have accused both sides of manipulating statistics for political purposes. The fighting nonetheless produced significant humanitarian consequences, including displacement, damage to critical infrastructure, and psychological trauma among civilian populations.

Around 24 June 2025, a ceasefire was announced following mediation efforts and intense diplomatic engagement, bringing the twelve-day escalation to an end. The ceasefire did not settle core disputes over Iran's nuclear programme, regional influence, or the legality of the use of force by the parties, but it halted immediate large-scale hostilities and shifted the focus to diplomatic and legal debates, including in the Security Council, on accountability, de-escalation, and future security arrangements.

5. Strait of Hormuz

5.1 Geographic and Strategic Importance

The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow maritime passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, bordered primarily by Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south. It is widely regarded as one of the world's most critical energy chokepoints, with shipping lanes only a few kilometres wide in places, organised through traffic separation schemes for inbound and outbound vessels.

A substantial share of globally traded crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) transits the Strait of Hormuz, including exports from major producers such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar. In recent years, roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption has passed through this corridor, making any significant disruption immediately relevant for world energy markets and global economic stability.

5.2 Vulnerability and Past Incidents

The Strait's narrowness and geography make it particularly vulnerable to military incidents, including mining, attacks on tankers, vessel seizures, and harassment of naval or commercial ships. In previous periods of tension, incidents involving damage to oil tankers, temporary vessel seizures, and close encounters between Iranian and foreign naval forces have raised insurance costs, prompted naval escorts, and triggered debates over freedom of navigation and the law of the sea.

Iran has repeatedly signalled that it views the Strait as a strategic lever in its confrontation with the United States and regional rivals, at times warning that it might restrict or threaten traffic if its own oil exports are blocked by sanctions. During and after the 2025 conflict, commercial traffic through the Strait continued but faced elevated risk perceptions, higher insurance premiums, and operational adjustments as shipping companies and navies assessed the possibility of escalation.

5.3 Situation as of 30 March 2026

By early March 2026, the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran had triggered a severe crisis in and around the Strait of Hormuz, leading many major shipping lines and tanker operators to suspend or reroute voyages. Several large container and tanker companies announced that they would halt transit through the Strait and redirect vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, citing security concerns after new strikes and Iranian threats to close the waterway.

Following US announcements of measures to block maritime traffic entering or leaving Iranian ports, and Iranian declarations that hostile or non-authorized vessels would be targeted, ship movements through the Strait fell dramatically compared to pre-war levels. Data from maritime tracking services indicates that average daily transits in March 2026 dropped to a small fraction of normal levels, with many vessels anchored in or near Gulf ports or diverted altogether.

During this period, Iran began consolidating a more direct role in managing what traffic remained, promoting a selective transit model under which certain vessels could pass subject to Iranian control and, reportedly, payment of fees. Iranian officials told international bodies that the Strait remained open to “non-hostile” ships not associated with the US and Israel, while releasing maps that steered traffic closer to Iranian territorial waters and designated parts of the established international traffic lane as a danger zone.

At the same time, the United States and partner navies increased their military presence and issued advisories warning commercial vessels to maintain distance from US warships and to exercise extreme caution in the broader Gulf region. War-risk insurers sharply raised premiums or withdrew coverage for voyages through the Strait, contributing to record-high freight rates and pushing some importers and exporters to seek alternative routes or suppliers.